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In response to a recent Supreme Court decision on the Clean Air Act, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) identified carbon and other green house gas emissions as being 
harmful to the environment.  Now the stage is set for major decisions on the approach to be used 
to address climate change.   
 
There are three major approaches for reducing domestic emissions: 
• Regulatory -- This approach defines a threshold of harmful emissions and sets up an 
effective monitoring and enforcement system with fines and penalties.   
• Tax & tax credit -- This approach imposes a tax in relation to the harmful emissions and 
may provide tax credits for adjusting to lower emission technologies.   
• Cap & trade – This approach sets an emissions ceiling over which the emitter must 
either reduce emissions or purchase emission rights from others who control and reduce 
emissions or deploy sequestration activities.  
 
As part of the process for developing a regulatory framework, EPA recently announced a 
proposed rule and comment period on “Indirect Land Effects.”  EPA officials indicate that the 
recently revised Renewable Fuel Standard Act asks for indirect land effects to be considered.  So 
on one level EPA appears to be doing its job.  However on another level, the proposed policy 
may create results that are different from initial intentions.   
 
Indirect land use regulatory logic 
 
Indirect land use theory goes something like this:  
• the U.S. biofuels industry creates more demand for domestic corn,  
• which causes less soybeans to be produced,  
• which in turn creates more demand for Brazilian soybeans,  
• which in turn causes more rainforests to be converted.  
 
Since Brazilian rainforests sequester carbon and green house gases, therefore U.S. biofuels 
should be regulated for indirect land use impacts on rain forest conversion.  
 
Does the logic make sense for regulatory purposes?  Brazil has more land area than the 
continental United States.  The development of Brazil’s natural resources has been a long 
standing national policy priority since 1960 when the national capital was moved to an 
undeveloped inland area.  Prior to that era, Brazil operated pretty much as a closed economy.  
The creation of Brasilia as the national capital was an overt strategy to spark the development of 
the nation’s western natural resources and infrastructure.  It has worked.  Brazil is now among the 
10 largest economies in the world.  Economic growth was 5.4 percent in 2007 with agriculture 
growing at 5.3 percent.  Brazil has a 24.7 billion trade surplus.   
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In 2008, the agribusiness sector accounted for 25 percent of Brazil’s GDP.  Agribusiness 
contributes to 36 percent of Brazil’s exports and 35 percent of the labor force in Brazil.  According 
to one report, Brazil has dramatically increased financial support for agriculture in recent years.  
The 2009 program spending increased by 11 percent over the previous year for agricultural 
production incentives in the face of rising food prices and domestic inflation.  In conclusion, 
agricultural development plays a key role for Brazil’s economic development and Brazilian 
rainforests may continue to be converted to other uses as long as it is within the sovereign rights 
and interests of the Brazilian people.   
 
But wait, now comes the climate change initiatives and proposals.  It may now be in the interests 
of all global citizens to curb the rain forest conversion.  If the goal is to curb rain forest conversion, 
then it is appropriate to ask about the key factors affecting the loss of rain forests.   
 
At the top of the list for Brazil, the factors might include:  
1. The devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999 which made Brazilian exports less 
expensive for all international consumers,  
2. The discontinuance of Brazilian export taxes, 
3. The investments in agricultural research and infrastructure being made by the Brazilian 
government to further develop the agricultural resources and rural economy,  
4. The increased spending by the Brazilian government to provide incentives for expanding 
Brazil’s crops and livestock industries,  
5. The economic growth of China and India and their respective growing demand for South 
American agricultural and energy exports,  
6. The rise in global energy prices heavily influenced by OPEC which contributed to the 
Brazilian drive for energy independence and expansion of the Brazilian sugar and ethanol 
industries, and  
7. Brazilians who see opportunities for earning income by converting rain forests into other 
land uses.   
 
While the U.S. biofuels industry has expanded in the more recent years and may have some 
correlation with recent land use change events, correlation does not necessarily prove causality.  
Other domestic incentives within Brazil likely have more influence on Brazilians who make the 
rainforest conversion decisions and doesn’t the ultimate causality rest with the growth in incomes 
and demand for food and energy? 
 
Risks of regulating indirect land use 
 
So, what are the risks of imposing an extra U.S. regulatory policy on indirect land use?   Some of 
the risks are that the policy may:  
• interfere with U.S. agricultural competitiveness,  
• not achieve desired results in rain forest preservation, 
• impede maximum potential in reducing domestic carbon and greenhouse gas emissions, 
and  
• impede progress toward less dependence on imported oil.   
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EPA is appropriately cautious in looking at the “peer reviewed” literature and public comments for 
potential policy rationale.  The infant body of literature on “Life Cycle Analysis” may not fully 
consider the context for international institutions, policy, and land use decisions.  Computer 
models representing international trade for agriculture have been around for several decades and 
were principally developed for forecasting and analyses of policy outcomes.  If the EPA and the 
California Air Resources Board are on the verge of using trade models to implement regulatory 
policy decisions, a second look at the literature in that area may be useful.  Computer trade 
models presume a constant institutional structure, policy framework, and predefined set of market 
relationships leading to presumed behavioral responses.  So by definition, the models can and 
will generate results that include a lot of empirical relationships.  This does not necessarily mean 
that causality exists in all correlations that are generated.   
 
In recent Congressional testimony, the focus was on the range of results and variability across 
the models available.  While computer trade models often do a pretty good job of simulating 
international market responses, they are not perfect.  One example presented in testimony 
highlighted a model forecast that was incorrect relative to the real world outcomes that actually 
occurred in 2006.  Perhaps some relevant exogenous policy response variables were excluded 
from the models.  The risk of ascribing causality and responsibility by computer simulation is that 
U.S. policy may generate benign results, or worse yet, vastly incorrect results regarding the 
actual impacts on rain forest preservation in Brazil.  Without a change in Brazil’s current land use 
policy, rain forest conversion may actually accelerate as Brazil’s agricultural economy continues 
to grow in response to dominate domestic expansion incentives, as Brazil’s share of world 
agricultural trade continues to grow, and as China’s demand expands.  In the meantime, U.S. 
carbon and green house gas regulations may incorrectly interfere with U.S. agricultural and 
biofuels markets and impede progress toward less dependence on imported oil.   
 
Brazil only uses 19 percent of its 790 million cultivable acres, so an obvious question is whether 
there is room for agricultural expansion without harming the rain forests?  So the Brazilian 
government might be able to legislate rain forest preservation and eliminate perceived market 
responses for indirect land use without much cost in terms of foregone economic activity.  
 
Policies to contain rainforest conversion 
 
It is important to note that for the U.S. indirect land use policy proposed there appears to be no 
direct institutional authority or policy linkages that effectively assure less rain forest conversion.  If 
the relevant policy goal is to enhance carbon and greenhouse gas sequestration, there are three 
general approaches for developing more effective outcomes.   
 
1. One approach would have the nations of the world to act so as to impose a cost on the 
nations with rain forest assets if they allowed continued conversion and loss of 
sequestration capability.   
 
2. A second more peaceful approach would be to compensate the nations with rain forest 
assets and/or the owners of rain forest assets by purchasing development rights, creating 
limited-use preserves, and providing incentives for appropriate rain forest management.   
 
In either case, the range of effective policy responses for assuring global rainforest 
protection appear to be confined to the realm of international negotiations among 
sovereign governments or private international philanthropy—neither of which are within 
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the normal span of decisions by agricultural producers and the biofuels industry who 
would face added U.S. regulatory deterrence by the proposed indirect land use rule.   
 
3. The third approach would be to allow the Brazilians and other nations with rain forests to 
have flexibility in addressing their domestic emission and sequestration issues within the 
emerging global market or policy framework of the post-Kyoto global environmental 
policy.  A strong and consistent general agreement on carbon and greenhouse gas 
emissions across nations in theory could potentially sustain a level playing field for 
international competition as externalities are internalized to create incentives for GHG 
reduction in each nation.   
 
Here a critical element might be whether the body of interenational decision-makers wish to utilize 
GHG market mechanisms to manage the GHG emissions and transfers of wealth to less 
developed nations or whether policy institutions would be used to manage such emissions and 
transfers within a more defined set of goals and limits.   The international quandry is increased if 
large players like China and India decide to opt out of market or policy mechanisms creating a 
free rider problem for both GHG emissions and wealth transfers to developing nations.   
 
Double counting is an accounting problem that the international framework would need to 
address.  Double counting occurs because the indirect land use effect of one country tends to be 
a direct land use effect for another.  The U.S. proposed indirect land use policy could be placed in 
the double counting category.  Many regulations are based on measures outcomes of actual 
behavior.   However in this case it often appears that RPG style computer simulations are being 
deployed simply because they are there and because they provide a method of arbitrarily 
allocating some responsibility among parties in the absence of measurable outcomes, more 
definitive studies, or policy-developed solutions.     
 
In a recent hearing on indirect land use, House Agriculture Committee leaders suggested the 
costs and emission effects for the U.S. to protect oil shipping lanes in the Middle East or 
environmental cost from oil spills should be added to calculations of indirect emission effects for 
petroleum based fuels.  This could represent an example of an indirect emissions cost that might 
be left out of first generation RPG-style computer simulations in an international regulatory 
framework.  Should these costs logically be included for nations that provide international 
security?   Academicians might argue over whether such emissions are considered direct or 
indirect costs along with other proposals.  On questions of prettiness—that cannot be scientifically 
measured—a more democratic policymaking process would use voting to determine the final 
answer.   
 
Conclusions 
 
In the final analysis, the approach of pursing a unilateral indirect land use policy appears to run 
the risk of imposing extra costs on a domestic sector while having no apparent impact on rain 
forest preservation.  RPG-style computer simulation approaches to regulation run the risk of 
incorrect attribution and may impede progress toward less dependence on imported oil.  An 
argument for bilateral agreements to serve as a temporary policy until an international policy 
framework is established could be made if there is a felt need by the U.S. to take steps to 
demonstrate timeliness and resolve in preserving rain forests.  Still, such action would likely raise 
issues over how widely the rainforest preservation costs should be spread and whether it should 
be confined to one industry.  While U.S. farmers and biofuels producers may not mind being held 
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responsible for their own behavior, they are not likely to be willingly held responsible for decisions 
made others in sovereign nations over which they have little or no control.   
 
The Obama Administration has an unprecedented opportunity to change the face of future 
opportunities across America and the globe by simultaneously moving from dependence on 
foreign oil imports toward creating new policies and income generating opportunities for 
producing clean renewable energy and reducing carbon and greenhouse gas emissions to 
address climate change.  Agriculturalists, environmentalists, private sector leaders and 
community leaders have multitudes of reasons for working together on decisions for responding 
to the new incentives, new opportunities, and new ventures that will be created by the new 
energy, carbon and greenhouse gas policies.  With no widely accepted and defensible “bright 
line” test for measuring and assigning emission impacts for indirect land use, the actual outcomes 
in terms of rainforest preservation in Brazil will remain dubious.  It is known, however, that the 
indirect land use proposals do have the potential to create major divisions between agriculture 
and environmentalists as well as regional conflicts between the heartland and the coasts that may 
derail the progress for the overall initiatives.  Without the indirect land use proposal, a much 
broader coalition of interests would have incentives to work together toward goals of change that 
can be more accurately and consistently measured for their direct impacts and effective 
outcomes.  
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